The Political Junkies
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IRAQ: BUSH’S PRIVATE PLAYGROUND
Revelations of the truth about the war in Iraq keep coming. As revelations emerge, a more precise time line of when and how Bush fabricated the war with Iraq is established.
September 11, 2001
Within hours of the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld issued orders:
Hours after a
commercial plane struck the Pentagon on September 11 2001 the US defence
secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, was issuing rapid orders to his aides to look for
evidence of Iraqi involvement, according to notes taken by one of them.
"Hard to get
good case. Need to move swiftly," the notes say. "Near term target needs - go
massive - sweep it all up, things related and not." . . .
The report
said: "On the afternoon of 9/11, according to contemporaneous notes, Secretary
Rumsfeld instructed General Myers [the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff] to
obtain quickly as much information as possible. The notes indicate that he also
told Myers that he was not simply interested in striking empty training sites.
He thought the US response should consider a wide range of options.
"The secretary
said his instinct was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same time, not only Bin
Laden. Secretary Rumsfeld later explained that at the time he had been
considering either one of them, or perhaps someone else, as the responsible
party."
The actual
notes suggest a focus on Saddam. "Best info fast. Judge whether good enough [to]
hit SH at same time - not only UBL [Pentagon shorthand for Usama/Osama bin
Laden]," the notes say. "Tasks. Jim Haynes [Pentagon lawyer] to talk with PW
[probably Paul Wolfowitz, then Mr Rumsfeld's deputy] for additional support ...
connection with UBL."
The fact that in the immediate wake of the attack that Secretary Rumsfeld would direct his attention to Saddam suggests that Iraq, who was defying the inspections program after the First Gulf War, was already a high priority of the Bush administration. The context of Rumsfeld’s interest in an attack suggests the “war option” was already on the table.
October 2002: Creating “Office of Special Plans”
The evidence is now clear that Secretary Rumsfeld’s orders on 9/11 were carried out and institutionalized within the Defense Department within weeks. Robert Dreyfuss and Jason Vest published an article in Mother Jones entitled, “The Lie Factory.” They reveal that:
Only weeks after 9/11, the Bush administration set up a secret Pentagon unit to create the case for invading Iraq. Here is the inside story of how they pushed disinformation and bogus intelligence and led the nation to war. – Mother Jones (subscription required for the entire article)
These are Dreyfuss and Vest’s major points:
Kwiatkowski, 43, a now-retired Air Force officer who served in the Pentagon's Near East and South Asia (NESA) unit in the year before the invasion of Iraq, observed how the Pentagon's Iraq war-planning unit manufactured scare stories about Iraq's weapons and ties to terrorists. "It wasn't intelligence—it was propaganda," she says. "They'd take a little bit of intelligence, cherry-pick it, make it sound much more exciting, usually by taking it out of context, often by juxtaposition of two pieces of information that don't belong together." It was by turning such bogus intelligence into talking points for U.S. officials—including ominous lines in speeches by President Bush and Vice President Cheney, along with Secretary of State Colin Powell's testimony at the U.N. Security Council last February—that the administration pushed American public opinion into supporting an unnecessary war.
[The authors] expose . . . the workings of a secret Pentagon intelligence unit and of the Defense Department's war-planning task force, the Office of Special Plans. It's the story of a close-knit team of ideologues who spent a decade or more hammering out plans for an attack on Iraq and who used the events of September 11, 2001, to set it into motion. – Mother Jones (emphasis added).
The authors publicly published this flow chart which is essential to understanding how Bush’s neoconservatives controlled the flow of intelligence information.
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Carefully notice that the Secret Intelligence Unit (“SIU”) acted as the “filter” for intelligence from the CIA, DIA and NSA.
March 2002: Decision to Invade
The intelligence apparatus that Secretary Rumsfeld put into place did not take long to accomplish its objective; create the case to attack Saddam. The decision to go to war was made within six months of the 9/11 attack and the earliest date that TPJ has found in the public records for Bush’s authorization to attack Iraq can be dated to March 2002 when Bush is quoted (emphasis added):
"Fuck Saddam. We’re taking him out," said President George W. Bush in March 2002, after poking his head into the office of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, TIME reports. – Information Clearing House
July 2002: Blair On Board
TPJ, AUTOMATICITY featured the revelation of a British intelligence memorandum, dating from July 2002: The July 2002 memorandum establishes that Bush and Blair made the decision to initiate war before well before that date:
The document reveals Blair backed “regime change” by force from the outset, despite warnings from Lord Goldsmith, the attorney-general, that such action could be illegal.
The minutes, published by The Sunday Times today, begins with the warning: “This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. The paper should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know.” It records a meeting in July 2002, attended by military and intelligence chiefs, at which Blair discussed military options having already committed himself to supporting President George Bush’s plans for ousting Saddam. – Times Online (emphasis added)
The July 2002, British memorandum suggests that the reason for invading Iraq was “regime change.” Blair understood however that regime change alone was insufficient, politically or legally.
“If the political context were right, people would support regime change,” said Blair. He added that the key issues were “whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan space to work”.
The political strategy proved to be arguing Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) posed such a threat that military action had to be taken. However, at the July meeting Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, said the case for war was “thin” as “Saddam was not threatening his neighbours and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran”.
Straw suggested they should “work up” an ultimatum about weapons inspectors that would “help with the legal justification”. Blair is recorded as saying that “it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors”.
August 2002: Selling the War
For Bush’s part in selling the war, a substantial mechanism in that effort was the creation of the White House Information Group (“WHIG”) in August 2002, within a month of the meeting described in the British memorandum above. Barton Gellman and Walter Pincus, in the August 10, 2003 Washington Post, broke the story of WHIGS creation and function (emphasis added):
The escalation of nuclear rhetoric . . . , including the introduction of the term "mushroom cloud" into the debate, coincided with the formation of a White House Iraq Group, or WHIG, a task force assigned to "educate the public" about the threat from Saddam Hussein, as a participant put it.
Systematic coordination began in August 2002, when Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card, Jr. formed the White House Iraq Group, or WHIG, to set strategy for each stage of the confrontation with Baghdad. A senior official who participated in its work called it "an internal working group, like many formed for priority issues, to make sure each part of the White House was fulfilling its responsibilities."
"In September 2002, the White House was beginning a major press offensive designed to prove that Iraq had a robust nuclear weapons program. That campaign was meant to culminate in the president's Oct. 7 speech in Cincinnati." – Source Watch
A separate secret briefing for the meeting said Britain and America had to “create” conditions to justify a war. – Times Online (emphasis added)
January 31, 2003: UN Resolution Not Necessary
Several weeks ago, another British government memorandum was leaked. The events described occurred on January 31, 2003, just two months before the invasion started. The disclosure is riveting (emphasis added):
Tony Blair told President George Bush that he was "solidly" behind US plans to invade Iraq before he sought advice about the invasion's legality and despite the absence of a second UN resolution, according to a new account of the build-up to the war published today.
A memo of a two-hour meeting between the two leaders at the White House on January 31 2003 - nearly two months before the invasion - reveals that Mr Bush made it clear the US intended to invade whether or not there was a second UN resolution and even if UN inspectors found no evidence of a banned Iraqi weapons programme.
While the latest memorandum disclosed makes certain the fact that the Bush/Blair strategy of presenting their case to the UN was concocted to help create public support for the war they had already planned, their decision to initiate war was actually made much earlier.
Collectively, the leaked notes of Secretary Rumsfeld’s meeting on 9/11 and subseqwuent intelligence memorandums demonstrate that Bush made the decision to invade Iraq within months of 9/11. In conformity with the ideological precepts of the Project for a New American Century, regime change was the only foundation for Bush’s war.
Once the decision was made the effort focused on selling the war to the American public and people of the world. Bush’s call to “disarm” Saddam was simply a public relations campaign to generate domestic public support for the coming war and to build international consensus. Powell’s UN presentation was a command performance; hopefully to secure specific UN authorization for the invasion, but to lay the public construct for war even if the UN did not provide a second resolution.
Cherry Picking and Beyond
The last leaked intelligence memorandum from Blair’s government makes clear that Bush and Blair’s administrations went far beyond “cherry picking” intelligence to make the case for war. Bush was willing to manufacture any excuse to justify the invasion:
George Bush
considered provoking a war with Saddam Hussein's regime by flying a United
States spyplane over Iraq bearing UN colours, enticing the Iraqis to take a shot
at it, according to a leaked memo of a meeting between the US President and Tony
Blair.
The two leaders were worried by the lack of hard evidence that Saddam Hussein
had broken UN resolutions, though privately they were convinced that he had.
According to the memorandum, Mr Bush said: "The US was thinking of flying U2
reconnaissance aircraft with fighter cover over Iraq, painted in UN colours. If
Saddam fired on them, he would be in breach."
He added: "It was also possible that a defector could be brought out who would
give a public presentation about Saddam's WMD, and there was also a small
possibility that Saddam would be assassinated." The memo damningly suggests the
decision to invade Iraq had already been made when Mr Blair and the US President
met in Washington on 31 January 2003 when the British Government was still
working on obtaining a second UN resolution to legitimise the conflict.
The leaders discussed the prospects for a second resolution, but Mr Bush said:
"The US would put its full weight behind efforts to get another resolution and
would 'twist arms' and 'even threaten'. But he had to say that if ultimately we
failed, military action would follow anyway." He added that he had a date, 10
March, pencilled in for the start of military action. The war actually began on
20 March.
Mr Blair replied that he was "solidly with the President and ready to do
whatever it took to disarm Saddam." But he also insisted that “a second Security
Council resolution would provide an insurance policy against the unexpected, and
international cover, including with the Arabs”.
The Show
The UN Inspectors were sent to Iraq with no real desire to find the truth, but in hopes that Saddam would reject the Inspectors as further justification for the war. When Saddam did not reject Inspectors outright and the inspectors did not immediately find WMD, the war was started before the Inspectors could complete their work, because war to effect regime change – not the truth – was the ultimate goal.
The Decision For War: Predating Bush’s Election?
TPJ has earnestly written over the past three years that the policy of regime change in Iraq was the brainchild of the neoconservative Project for a New American Century. Dreyfus and Vest allude to the members of the Project for a New American Century in their article in Mother Jones, referenced above:
It's the story of a close-knit team of ideologues who spent a decade or more hammering out plans for an attack on Iraq and who used the events of September 11, 2001, to set it into motion. – Mother Jones (emphasis added).
Bush may have bought into the PNAC’s grand global design even before his election in 2000. In fact, Bush may have given Americans actually alluded to his intentions during the 2nd debate with Al Gore in October, 2000 in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
Many people remember Bush’s position opposing “national building” as the design of American foreign policy. Since the war in Iraq, many observers have asserted that Bush acted contrary to his commitment to the American people. Such assertions are not accurate.
Bush did eschew “nation building.” Yet, Bush specifically announced his support for the use of American military action to effect “regime change.” Consider these exchanges during the debate in the context that Bush, earlier in the debate, called for stronger sanctions against Saddam:
Bush: And so I
don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation-building.
BUSH: I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win war. I think our
troops ought to be used to help overthrow a dictator that's in our -- and it's
in our -- when it's in our best interests.
. . .
But there's got to be priorities. And the Middle East is a priority for a lot of
reasons, as is Europe and the Far East and our own hemisphere. And those are my
four top priorities should I be the president. It's not to say we won't be
engaged nor trying -- nor should we -- you know, work hard to get other nations
to come together to prevent atrocity.
. . .
But we can't be all things to all people in the world, Jim [Leher]. And I think
that's where maybe the vice president and I begin to have some differences. I am
worried about over-committing our military around the world. I want to be
judicious in its use.
You mentioned Haiti. I wouldn't have sent troops to Haiti. I didn't think it was
a mission worthwhile. It was a nation-building mission. And it was not very
successful. It cost us billions, a couple of billions of dollars, and I'm not so
sure democracy is any better off in Haiti than it was before.
. . .
Our military's meant to fight and win war. That's what it's meant to do. And
when it gets over extended, morale drops.
. . .
But I'm going to be judicious as to how to use the military. It needs to be in
our vital interest, the mission needs to be clear, and the exit strategy
obvious.
There are still many truths that must be discovered. However, the essential parameters of how Bush led America to war in Iraq. It is unfortunate that Bush did not follow his own dictates that in taking America to war the “mission needs to be clear and the exit strategy obvious.”
ANY PORT IN A STORM
Bush administration approval of the sale of rights in 21 American ports to Dubai Ports World has angered Americans and generated bipartisan political opposition in Congress.
The Bush administration is making these assertions:
The White House said on Wednesday that counterterrorism experts had looked at the deal and concluded there was no threat to national security.
But the administration did admit it should have briefed Congress sooner about the deal.
It also said President Bush was unaware of the sale until the deal had been approved.
Nevertheless, the president said he believed it should go ahead.
As typical with the Bush administration, the assertion that “counterterrorism experts had looked at the deal and concluded there was not threat to national security” is not entirely true.
The Homeland Security Department objected at first to a United Arab Emirates company's taking over significant operations at six U.S. ports. It was the lone protest among members of the government committee that eventually approved the deal without dissent.
The department's early objections were settled later in the government's review of the $6.8 billion deal after Dubai-owned DP World agreed to a series of security restrictions.
Bush’s failure to disclose the initial security concerns is just another example that the word of the Bush administration cannot be trusted by its citizens.
Last Update: 04/02/2006